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In recent years, two important developments have spurred renewed interest in the macroeconomic
eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions: global imbalances and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08. In the case of
global imbalances, ﬁnancial frictions have been invoked to account for the large and persistent
capital ﬂows from Asia to the United States and other developed economies (e.g. Caballero et
al. 2008). According to this explanation, the ultimate reason behind these capital ﬂo w si st h a t—
being subject to ﬁnancial frictions — Asian ﬁnancial markets have been unable to supply the assets
required to channel their high savings towards productive investment. Hence, these savings have
ﬂowed to developed ﬁnancial markets in which these assets could be supplied. In the case of the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08, ﬁnancial frictions have also been invoked to explain the run-up to the
crisis and the unfolding of events during the crisis itself (e.g. Bernanke 2009, Brunnermeier 2009).
In most of these explanations, however, ﬁnancial frictions are cast in an entirely diﬀerent light:
instead of constraining the supply of assets, thereby limiting the amount of resources that can be
channeled towards productive investment, they are portrayed as the source of an excessive supply
of assets that has channeled too many resources towards unproductive investment. Which of these
views of ﬁnancial frictions is correct?
The answer is that they both are, although each of these views has a diﬀerent type of ﬁnancial
friction in mind. On the one hand, underprovision of assets and limited investment is typically
attributed to some form of pledgeability constraint, which limits the amount of resources that
creditors can seize from debtors in the event of default. On the other hand, overprovision of assets
is typically attributed to some form of adverse selection, which fuels investment by unproductive or
ineﬃcient individuals. Since ﬁnancial markets in the real world are jointly characterized by some
measure of limited pledgeability and some degree of adverse selection, both views are useful to
understand reality. But how do they complement one another? How does, for example, the presence
of adverse selection aﬀect the size and direction of capital ﬂows in the presence of pledgeability
constraints? How do these capital ﬂo w si nt u r na ﬀect the ineﬃciencies associated to adverse
selection? Answering these questions is essential for gaining a thorough understanding of recent
events. They are hard to address with existing macroeconomic models of ﬁnancial frictions, however,
which are mostly concerned with the eﬀects of limited pledgeability while neglecting those of adverse
selection. In this paper, we ﬁll this gap by bringing adverse selection to the foreground.
To do so, we develop a standard growth model in which individuals need to access credit markets
1to invest in capital accumulation. In particular, individuals are endowed with some resources and
an investment project for producing capital and they must decide whether (i) to undertake their
project and become entrepreneurs, in which case they demand funds from credit markets or (ii) to
forego their project and become savers, in which case they supply their resources to credit markets.
Crucially, it is assumed that the quality of investment opportunities diﬀers across individuals, so
that it is in principle desirable for the most productive among them to become entrepreneurs and for
the least productive among them to become savers. To give adverse selection a central role in credit
markets, however, we also assume that an individual’s productivity is private information and thus
unobservable by lenders. What are the main consequences of this assumption for macroeconomic
outcomes?
The ﬁrst-order implication of asymmetric informati o ni nc r e d i tm a r k e t si st h a t ,b yp r e v e n t i n g
lenders from distinguishing among diﬀerent types of borrowers, it induces cross-subsidization be-
tween high- and low-productivity entrepreneurs. The reason for this is simple. Precisely because
lenders cannot observe individual productivities, all borrowers must pay the same contractual in-
terest rate in equilibrium. This implies that high-productivity entrepreneurs, who repay often,
eﬀectively face a higher cost of funds than low-productivity entrepreneurs, who repay only seldom.
It is this feature that gives rise to adverse selection by providing some low-productivity individuals,
who would be savers in the absence of cross-subsidization, with incentives to become entrepreneurs.
There are thus two clear macroeconomic implications of adverse selection: (i) by boosting equi-
librium borrowing and investment, it leads to an increase in the economy’s equilibrium interest
rate, and; (ii) by fostering ineﬃcient entrepreneurship, it generates a negative wedge between the
marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate.
We show that both of these implications have important consequences for capital ﬂows when
we allow the economy to borrow from and/or lend to the international ﬁnancial market. First,
through its eﬀect on the equilibrium interest rate, adverse selection induces the economy to attract
more capital ﬂows than it otherwise would: relative to the full-information economy, then, the
presence of adverse selection boosts net capital inﬂows from the international ﬁnancial market.
A second and related consequence is that, since the marginal return to investment lies below the
equilibrium interest rate, these capital inﬂows can be welfare-reducing: in the presence of adverse
selection, then, there is scope for optimal intervention in the form of government controls on capital
inﬂows. Finally, since the extent to which it distorts individual incentives depends on the state of
the economy, adverse selection exacerbates the volatility of capital ﬂows, capital accumulation and
2output.
This last point warrants some discussion. In our economy, for a given interest rate, the incen-
tives of less productive individuals to become entrepreneurs are strongest when the capital stock
and income are low: it is precisely in this case that they are most heavily cross-subsidized by
productive entrepreneurs, since a substantial fraction of investment needs to be ﬁnanced through
borrowing. Under these conditions, then, adverse selection exerts a strong boost on investment,
capital accumulation and capital inﬂows. As the economy’s capital stock and income increase,
however, the extent of cross-subsidization decreases: individuals become wealthier, an increasing
fraction of their investment must be ﬁnanced with their own resources and entrepreneurship loses
its appeal for less productive individuals. Economic growth therefore softens the overinvestment
induced by adverse selection and its impact on investment, capital accumulation and capital in-
ﬂows languishes. We show how, through this mechanism, adverse selection generates endogenous
boom-bust cycles in which capital inﬂows fuel periods of positive capital accumulation and high
growth that are followed by periods negative capital accumulation and economic contraction.
These ﬁndings on the eﬀects of adverse selection are the exact opposite of the ones stressed by
the literature for the case of limited pledgeability. The latter is the standard friction in existing
models, which assume that there is a limit on the resources that creditors can appropriate in the
event of a default because borrowers are capable of diverting part of the project’s proceeds. There
are two clear macroeconomic implications that are recurrent in the literature: (i) by constraining
equilibrium borrowing and investment, limited pledgeability leads to a decrease in the economy’s
equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) by preventing eﬃcient investment from being undertaken, lim-
ited pledgeability generates a positive wedge between the marginal return to investment and the
equilibrium interest rate. Clearly, the contrast between these implications of limited pledgeability
and our ﬁndings for the case of adverse selection extend to the open economy as well. Our results
thus complement the existing literature and provide a more accurate picture of the relationship
between ﬁnancial frictions and the macroeconomy.
Real-world credit markets are not characterized solely by adverse selection or by limited pledge-
ability, however, but rather by a mixture of the two. It is important then to know whether our
ﬁndings regarding the eﬀects of adverse selection are robust to the inclusion of limited pledgeability:
after all, if one friction tends to boost investment while the other one tends to constrain it, one
could think that they somehow oﬀset one another. To address this question, we extend our baseline
model to encompass both frictions. We ﬁnd that there is a sense in which limited pledgeability and
3adverse selection exacerbate one another so that, if anything, the inclusion of the former makes the
consequences of the latter more severe.
The reason for this “complementarity” between both frictions is that their interaction prevents
the interest rate from attaining market clearing. On the one hand, pledgeability constraints require
the interest rate to be low in order for lenders to break even; on the other hand, a low interest rate
decreases the returns to savings and induces unproductive individuals to become entrepreneurs,
exacerbating adverse selection. The ultimate result is the combination of a low interest rate and
a large and relatively unproductive pool of potential borrowers, which requires rationing to attain
market-clearing. The interaction of both frictions is therefore more harmful than either one of
them on its own, which either boosts or constrains total investment but does not aﬀect the order
in which projects are ﬁnanced. The combination of both frictions instead does, so that — for each
given level of investment — the average productivity of ﬁnanced projects falls: the reason is that,
due to credit rationing, those projects actually ﬁnanced are randomly selected out of a larger pool
of potential borrowers.
Our paper is related to the large body of research that studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of
ﬁnancial frictions. This literature, which goes back to the contributions of Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), stresses the role of borrowing constraints for macroeconomic
outcomes. Of this literature, we are closest in interest and focus to the branch that has extended
the analysis to open economies, studying the eﬀects of contracting frictions on the direction and
magnitude of capital ﬂows. Most of these papers illustrate how contracting frictions can restrict
an economy’s ability to borrow from the international ﬁnancial market, thereby generating capital
outﬂows even in capital-scarce economies. Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990), Boyd and Smith (1997),
Matsuyama (2004) and Aoki et al. (2009) fall within this category. Similar models have been used
recently to account for global imbalances. In Caballero et al. (2008), for example, high-growing
developing economies may experience capital outﬂows due to pledgeability constraints that restrict
their supply of ﬁnancial assets. In Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007), it is instead the lack
of insurance markets in developing economies that fosters precautionary savings and the consequent
capital outﬂows. To the best of our knowledge, however, we are the ﬁrst to analyze the implications
of adverse selection for capital ﬂows as well as its interaction with pledgeability constraints.
In its modeling of asymmetric information, our paper is related to the work on adverse selection
by Bester (1985, 1987), DeMeza and Webb (1987), and Besanko and Thakor (1987). Of these, our
model is closest to DeMeza and Webb (1987), in which adverse selection also fosters overinvestment.
4In the implications of adverse selection for volatility our model is related to Martin (2008), who
also shows how this type of friction can give rise to endogenous cycles.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup. Section 3 studies the
dynamics of the closed economy when credit markets are characterized by adverse selection and it
extends these results to the inclusion of limited pledgeability. Section 4 studies the dynamics of the
economy under ﬁnancial integration, doing it ﬁrst for the case of pure adverse selection and then
extending these results to the inclusion of limited pledgeability. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2B a s i c s e t u p
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of young and old, all with size one. We
use Jt to denote the set of individuals born at time t.T i m es t a r t sa tt =0a n dt h e ng o e so nf o r e v e r .
All generations maximize the expected consumption when old so that Ut = Etct+1;w h e r eUt and
ct+1 are the welfare and the old-age consumption of generation t.
The output of the economy is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function of labor and capital:




t with γ ∈ (0,1),a n d lt and kt are the economy’s labor force and capital
stock, respectively. All generations have one unit of labor which they supply inelastically when they
are young, i.e. lt =1 . The stock of capital in period t+1is produced through the investment made
by generation t during its youth.2 In order to ensure that ﬁnancial markets have an important role
to play, we assume that individuals diﬀer in their ability to produce capital.
In particular, individuals in each generation are indexed by j ∈ Jt and they are uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. Each of them is endowed with an investment project of ﬁxed
size, which requires I units of output at time t. The project of individual j ∈ Jt succeeds with
probability pj = j ∈ [0,1], in which case it delivers α · I units of capital in period t +1 .W i t h
probability 1 − pj, the project of individual j ∈ Jt fails and it delivers nothing.
In this setting, the capital stock at t +1depends not only on the total investment made at
time t, but also on the productivity of such investment. In particular, if we let E(pt) denote the
expected probability of success among investment projects undertaken at time t,w ec a nd e ﬁne
1In this regard, our paper is also related to the endogenous cycle literature, albeit less directly. Martin (2008)
provides a brief discussion of this literature. Of these papers, perhaps the ones closest to ours are Reichlin and
Siconolﬁ (2004) and Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2004), the last of which stresses the link between ﬁnancial
frictions and volatility in small-open economies.
2That is, we assume that that capital fully depreciates in production. We also assume that the ﬁrst generation
found some positive amount of capital to work with, i.e. k0 > 0.
5At = A(pt)=α· E(pt) as the average productivity of such investment.3 Then, we can write the
law of motion of capital as:
kt+1 = At · st · k
γ
t ,( 1 )
where st is the investment rate, i.e. the fraction of output that is devoted to capital formation.
Markets are competitive and factors of production are paid the value of their marginal product:
wt = w(kt)=( 1− γ) · k
γ
t and qt = γ · k
γ−1
t ,( 2 )
where wt and qt are the wage and the rental rate of capital, respectively.
To solve the model, we need to ﬁnd the investment rate and the expected productivity of
investment. In our economy the investment rate is straightforward: the old do not save and the
young save all their income. What do the young do with their savings? As a group, the young
can only use them to build capital. This means that the investment rate equals the savings of
the young. Since the latter equal labor income, which is a constant fraction 1 − γ of output, the
investment rate is constant as in the classic Solow (1956) model:
st =1− γ.( 3 )
For a given initial capital stock k0 > 0, a competitive equilibrium of our economy is thus a
sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 satisfying Equations (1) and (3). A full characterization of such an equilibrium
clearly requires an understanding of the way in which At is determined: this depends on the workings
of credit markets, which intermediate resources among the young in each generation. To save for
old age, each young individual must choose between (i) becoming an entrepreneur and undertaking
an investment project, which requires credit whenever I>w t, and; (ii) lending his wage to other
individuals who want to become entrepreneurs in exchange for an interest payment. We assume
that all such borrowing and lending is intermediated through banks. Banks are ﬁnite in number,
risk neutral and competitive. They act as intermediaries that collect deposits from individuals to
oﬀer loan contracts to active entrepreneurs. On the deposit side, they take the gross interest factor
on deposits rt+1 as given and they compete on the loan market by designing contracts that take
the following form:
3That is, At denotes the average units of capital produced per unit invested in such projects.
6Deﬁnition 1 Entrepreneurs and banks sign a contract deﬁned by the couple (Lt,R t+1),w h e r eLt is
the amount lent to entrepreneurs for investment at time t and Rt+1 is the gross contractual interest
rate on the loan at time t+1. In the event of success, entrepreneurs pay back the amount borrowed
adjusted by the interest factor. Otherwise, they default and the bank gets nothing.
This implies that the expected proﬁt that individual j ∈ Jt obtains from loan contract (Lt,R t+1)
in the event that he chooses to become an entrepreneur is
πt(pj,L t,R t+1)=pj · [qt+1 · α · I − Rt+1 · Lt].( 4 )
Since competition among banks is usually crucial in determining the types of contracts that are
oﬀered in equilibrium, it is important to specify how we model it. We follow the traditional model
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and model competition in the credit market as a two-stage game
of screening. In the ﬁrst stage, banks design a menu of loan contracts and, in the second stage,
individuals that want to become entrepreneurs apply to the contract that they ﬁnd most attractive.
It is assumed that each bank gets the same share of total deposits and, if they design the same
contract, they get the same share and composition of loan applications.
3 Equilibria in the closed economy
The key driving force behind the dynamics of our economy lies clearly in the production of capital
and hence in the functioning of credit markets. We now analyze the competitive equilibrium of
the economy under diﬀerent assumptions regarding these markets. We ﬁrst consider the case of
frictionless credit markets, which will provide a useful benchmark that we can turn to throughout
the paper. We then analyze the case in which credit markets are characterized by the presence of
asymmetric information, and we contrast it to the more familiar one of limited pledgeability.
Regardless of the particular credit-market friction that is imposed, there are two features that
any equilibrium must satisfy. First, all contracts oﬀered must satisfy a zero-proﬁt condition for
banks: clearly, no equilibrium contracts can yield negative proﬁts to intermediaries, and — due to
perfect competition — no equilibrium contracts can yield positive proﬁts either. Second, investment
in equilibrium must satisfy a “participation constraint”: since all individuals care only about old-
age consumption, they will only choose to become entrepreneurs if the return of doing so exceeds
that of being a depositor in the banking system.
73.1 The frictionless economy
In the absence of any friction, the equilibrium of our economy is straightforward. Given that
any individual must borrow Lt = I − wt to become an entrepreneur, the only relevant degree of
heterogeneity among individuals is the probability of success of the investment project. Individual
j ∈ Jt will decide to become an entrepreneur if and only if the expected proﬁts from starting the
project (Equation (4)) exceeds the revenues from depositing his funds in the banks. Formally, the
participation constraint is given by:
πt(pj,L t,R t+1)=pj · [qt+1 · α · I − Rt+1(j) · (I − w(kt))] ≥ rt+1 · w(kt),( 5 )
where Rt+1(j) denotes the contractual interest rate faced by individual j ∈ Jt.4
Because of the zero-proﬁt condition of banks, we know that the contractual interest rate will
vary across borrowers according to their probability of success. In particular, it must be true in
equilibrium that




which allows us to rewrite Equation (5) as:
pj ·
∙
qt+1 · α · I −
rt+1
pj
· (I − w(kt))
¸
≥ rt+1 · w(kt). (7)
Equation (7) determines a critical probability of success b pt, below which individuals prefer to








which has a very natural interpretation. In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, only those projects
that yield a rate of return that is higher than the interest rate will be undertaken, i.e. those projects
for which pj·qt+1·α ≥ rt+1. By increasing the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur, higher
interest rates on deposits raise the threshold productivity b pt and lower aggregate investment; on
the contrary, by increasing the return of becoming an entrepreneur, a higher future price of capital
4In a setting with uncertainty, the participation constraint at time t would be a function of the expected return
to capital at time t+1: in our environment, there is perfect foresight and hence the participation constraint depends
directly on qt+1. Naturally, the addition of uncertainty to our economy would be straightforward since all individuals
are risk neutral.
8qt+1 or productivity of investment α both lower the threshold probability of success b pt and expand
aggregate investment.
Any equilibrium in the credit market must therefore satisfy Equation (8). But it must also satisfy
a market clearing condition, since the supply of savings has to be matched by an equal internal
demand for investment in equilibrium. This condition, which also depends on the productivity of
the marginal investor, can be expressed as follows:







Equations (8) and (9) jointly determine the credit-market equilibrium of our economy, characterized
by a pair (b pt,r t+1).5 It follows directly that, in equilibrium, the average productivity of investment







,( 1 0 )
which is decreasing in wages. Intuitively, as the economy grows and wages increase, so does invest-
ment and less productive projects are therefore undertaken. Equations (8) and (9) also provide the
equilibrium interest rate for this economy:






.( 1 1 )
Finally, the law of motion of this economy follows from replacing Equations (3) and (10) into
Equation (1):
kt+1 = α ·
∙
1 −





· (1 − γ) · k
γ
t ,( 1 2 )
which can be shown to be increasing and concave as long as wages do not exceed the size of
investment projects I, which is clearly the case of interest to us. We assume that this holds
throughout.6
5The rental price of capital qt+1, which is also endogenous, depends ultimately on e pt.





1−γ · (1 − γ)
1
1−γ .





1−γ , and making sure that even at this steady-state wages do not exceed the size of investment projects I.
93.2 Adverse selection
Consider now that we modify the previous setup by introducing a friction in credit markets. In
particular, we initially focus on a type of friction that has allegedly been at the heart of the
recent turmoil in ﬁnancial markets: adverse selection. Relative to the model of Section 3.1, the
only modiﬁcation that we make is to assume that individual j’s probability of success is private
information and is thus unobservable to banks.7 Because this is the only dimension along which
projects diﬀer from one another, banks will now oﬀer one “pooling” contract that will be accepted
by individuals that diﬀer in their probability of success.8
If we use (b Lt, b Rt+1) to deﬁne the pooling loan contract oﬀered by banks under adverse selection,
the participation constraint of an individual j ∈ Jt is now given by:
π(pj, b Lt, b Rt+1)=pj ·
h
qt+1 · α · I − b Rt+1 · (I − w(kt))
i
≥ rt+1 · w(kt),( 1 3 )
which is essentially the same as Equation (5) with the diﬀerence that the contractual interest rate
b Rt+1 is now independent of the individual’s probability of success pj. We can use Equation (13)
to obtain the marginal investor, i.e. the investor that is indiﬀerent between applying to a loan
contract or depositing his savings in the bank. We use b pAS,t denote the probability of success of
this investor, where the subscript AS indicates the presence of adverse selection. The zero-proﬁt
condition of banks takes this into account because, since banks must break even on average, the
contractual interest rate b Rt+1 must reﬂect the average quality in the pool of borrowers. Formally,
it must hold in equilibrium that:









7In our setup, in which this is the only dimension along which projects diﬀer from one another, the debt/loan
contracts analyzed in the previous section cannot be improved upon by banks.
8In this sense, our environment is similar to DeMeza and Webb (1987).
10By combining Equations (13) and (14) we can obtain the equivalent of Equation (8):
b pAS,t ·
∙
qt+1 · α · I − 2 ·
rt+1
1+b pAS,t
· (I − w(kt))
¸
= rt+1 · w(kt)
⇔
rt+1 =




· (I − w(kt))
,
(15)
which deﬁnes an increasing relationship between b pAS,t and rt+1 that must be satisﬁed in equilibrium.
Together with the market clearing condition of Equation (9), this relationship determines the credit-




,( 1 6 )
rt+1 = qt+1 · α ·
[2I − w(kt)] · [I − w(kt)]
I2 +[ I − w(kt)]
2 .( 1 7 )
A direct comparison of Equations (9) and (16) reveals that b pt = b pAS,t, so that the introduction
of asymmetric information does not change the average productivity of projects undertaken in
the closed economy. This follows from two special assumptions in our model: (i) since savings
are inelastic, investment must equal the total wage bill of the economy at all times, regardless
of whether there is asymmetric information or not, and; (ii) since projects are of ﬁxed size, the
total investment undertaken in the economy is simply equal to this wage bill divided by the size of
each project I. This means that the presence of asymmetric information does not aﬀect the law of
motion of capital in our economy, which is still given by Equation (12). At the end of the day, all
savings must be invested in capital formation and the presence of adverse selection does not aﬀect
the order in which projects are ﬁnanced. Although none of our qualitative results depend on it, we
ﬁnd this to be a desirable feature of our model because it will allow us to isolate (i) the economic
eﬀects of the interaction between adverse selection and limited pledgeability, which we address in
Section 3.4, and; (ii) the economic eﬀects of adverse selection under ﬁnancial integration, which we
address in Section 4.
But how is it that, despite the presence of asymmetric information, no individual with pj < b pAS,t
is tempted to become an entrepreneur? The answer, as can be seen by comparing Equations (11)
9Once again, we do not include the rental price of capital qt+1 in the deﬁnition of equilibrium because it is
determined by e pAS,t (see Footnote 5).
11and (17), is that the equilibrium interest rate increases in order to discourage this type of entry. In
the presence of adverse selection, less productive individuals are eﬀectively cross-subsidized in their
loan payments by their more productive peers: consequently, for any given interest rate on deposits,
the demand for credit is larger than it would be in the frictionless economy, i.e. the productivity
of the marginal investor is lower. In other words, under adverse selection, the productivity of the
marginal investor lies below the market interest rate. In the closed economy, in which the the
total amount of investment must necessarily equal the total wage bill, this leads to an increase in
the interest rate in order to restore equilibrium. This increase in the interest rate relative to the
frictionless economy of Section 3.1 is the sole consequence of adverse selection.10
3.3 Limited pledgeability
In analyzing the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions, the recent literature has focused
predominantly on the eﬀects of limited pledgeability.11 The severity of this friction, which arises
when borrowers are capable of diverting part of their ex-post resources away from the reach of
creditors, is believed to be a good indicator of the quality of ﬁnancial institutions in an economy.12
Because of this, we want to understand how our analysis of adverse selection extends to the case
in which credit markets are also characterized by some form of limited pledgeability. To do so, we
ﬁrst show brieﬂy how the introduction of this friction aﬀects — by itself — the equilibrium of the
frictionless economy of Section 3.1.13 We will then analyze the equilibrium of our economy when
both frictions are simultaneously present.
Consider then that we modify the frictionless economy by assuming that, in the event of default,
lenders can seize at most a fraction λ ∈ [0,1] of the resources of borrowers. In this case, the set of
10Once again, this result depends on our assumptions regarding the perfectly inelastic supply of total savings
and the ﬁxed size of investment projects. It is because of these two features that adverse selection does not aﬀect
the amount or the productivity of investment. If total savings were increasing on the interest rate, for example,
adverse selection would lead to an increase in the equilibrium level of investment. If projects did not have a ﬁxed
size, adverse selection would also aﬀect the composition of investment. These modiﬁcations would complicate the
exposition without adding much to our results.
11See, for example, Aoki et al. (2009), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Matsuyama (2004) and Lorenzoni
(2008).
12This is true both in the theoretical and in the empirical literature. In the latter, the quality of ﬁnancial institutions
is usually proxied with the creditor rights index based on La Porta et al. (1998). This index, which is the leading
“institutional” predictor of credit market development around the world, measures the powers of secured lenders in
bankruptcy and it essentially reﬂects the ability of these lenders to seize assets in the event of default.
13This has the advantage of allowing us to contrast the ﬁndings of the previous section with those that arise most
commonly in the literature.
12loan contracts (Lt,R t+1) that can be implemented are those for which:
Rt+1(j) · Lt+1 = Rt+1(j) · (I − w(kt)) ≤ λ · qt+1 · α · I.( 1 8 )
Equation (18) introduces an additional constraint that, in addition to the participation con-
straint of entrepreneurs in Equation (5) and the zero-proﬁt condition of banks in Equation (6),
loan contracts must satisfy in equilibrium. Note that, when the pledgeability constraint of Equa-
tion (18) binds in equilibrium, the participation constraint of Equation (5) is slack. In this case,
some individuals that would invest in the frictionless economy cannot do so in the presence of
limited pledgeability because they cannot commit to a repayment that would allow the bank to
break even. Hence, under a binding pledgeability constraint, the marginal investor for a given
interest rate becomes an individual with a higher probability of success relative to the frictionless
economy. Formally, if we use b pt(λ) to denote the probability of success of the marginal investor in
















.( 1 9 )
Equation (19) illustrates the two types of equilibria that may arise under limited pledgeability.
On the one hand, if λ>1 −
w(kt)
I
, the pledgeability constraint does not bind in equilibrium and
we are back in the frictionless case: these are economies in which wages are high relative to the
size of investment, so that leverage is low and pledgeability is not a concern. On the other hand,
if λ ≤ 1 −
w(kt)
I
, the pledgeability constraint binds in equilibrium and investment is constrained
relative to the frictionless economy: these are economies in which wages are low relative to the size
of investment and the required level of leverage is too high given the institutional constraints.
To determine the credit-market equilibrium of the economy (b pt(λ),r t+1),w ec a nc o m b i n eE q u a -
tion (19) with the credit market clearing condition of Equation (9).14 A ﬁr s tr e s u l tt h a te m e r g e s
is that b pt(λ)=b pt in equilibrium, so that limited pledgeability has no eﬀect on the average pro-
ductivity of projects that are undertaken: as was the case in the economy under adverse selection,
ultimately the totality of labor income must be directed towards investment in the closed economy.
Hence, the law of motion of capital is still given by Equation (12) and pledgeability constraints
14We have already stressed that, when the pledgeability constraint of Equation (18) is binding, the participation
constraint of Equation (5) is slack. Hence, as in the previous sections, an equilibrium is characterized in this case by
two equations (the participation constraint and the market-clearing condition) and two unknowns (e pt(λ) and rt+1).
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if w(kt) ≥ (1 − λ) · I
.( 2 0 )
Equation (20) illustrates the basic workings of this economy. A binding pledgeability constraint
implies that, for each given level of the interest rate, investment is lower than it would be in
the frictionless economy, i.e. the productivity of the marginal investor is higher. Under limited
pledgeability, the productivity of the marginal investor thus raises above the interest rate. In the
closed economy, in which total investment equals the total wage bill, the interest rate must fall
to restore equilibrium. Economies with more severe credit frictions, i.e. with lower λ, therefore
display lower equilibrium interest rates. The severity of credit market frictions, however, does not
aﬀect the law of motion of the closed economy: once again, it aﬀects neither total investment nor
the order in which projects are ﬁnanced.15
3.4 A tale of two frictions
We now extend our analysis of adverse selection to an economy in which credit markets are also
characterized by limited pledgeability as modeled in the previous section. In this economy, banks
can neither directly observe an entrepreneur’s probability of success at the time of granting credit
nor can they fully seize an entrepreneur’s resources in the event of default.
The economy is formally similar to the one analyzed in Section 3.2. Equation (13) still identiﬁes
the marginal investor, i.e. the individual that is indiﬀerent between applying to a loan contract and
depositing his savings in the bank: let b pAS,t(λ) denote the probability of success of this investor in
the economy with both adverse selection and limited pledgeability as captured by λ. The zero-proﬁt
condition of banks is still given by Equation (14), so that the contractual interest rate must allow
banks to break even given the average probability of success within the pool of borrowers:
b Rt+1 =
rt+1





Since the participation constraint and the zero-proﬁt condition of banks are as before, so is the
relationship between the rt+1 and b pAS,t(λ) captured by Equation (15).
15This feature of our model, which closely mirrors Matsuyama (2004), is of course due to the particular set of
assumptions that we make (see Footnote 10).
14Besides Equation (15) and the market-clearing condition of Equation (9), an equilibrium (b pAS,t(λ),r t+1)
in the presence of limited pledgeability must also satisfy:
b Rt+1 · (I − w(kt)) ≤ λ · qt+1 · α · I,( 2 2 )
which is the equivalent of Equation (18) for the economy with adverse selection. The novelty in
Equation (22) is that it is independent of j, so that it either binds for all borrowers or for none of
them. This is not the case when the only friction is limited pledgeability and the contractual interest
rate can vary with the borrower’s probability of success. As we saw in Section 3.3, the pledgeability
constraint is then binding for some borrowers j ∈ Jt but not for others. Once adverse selection is
introduced, however, this is no longer possible: the contractual interest rate must necessarily be
the same for all borrowers, and this means that the pledgeability constraint will either bind or not
bind for all of them simultaneously.
There are clearly two types of equilibria in this economy. In the ﬁrst one, the pledgeability
constraint is not binding, Equation (22) is slack and — exactly as in Section 3.2 — the equilibrium
is fully described by Equations (15) and (16). In the second one, which is the one of interest here,
the credit constraint binds and the equilibrium must also satisfy Equation (22) with an equality.
But this poses a problem: this equilibrium must satisfy one more equation but it is apparently
described by the same two variables, b pAS,t(λ) and rt+1. In other words, Equations (15) and (22)
jointly determine in this case the combination of b pAS,t(λ) and rt+1 that satisfy the participation
constraint of individuals and the zero-proﬁt condition of banks. But how do we know that this pair
also satisﬁes market clearing?
The answer is that, in general, it does not. When the pledgeability constraint is binding, it can
be shown that the pool of borrowers is too large and there is an excess demand for credit.16 The only
way to restore market-clearing in such a situation is by rationing some borrowers in equilibrium,
in the sense that not all of those who wish to become entrepreneurs will actually get credit. If we
use εt to denote the probability of receiving a loan, the relevant market-clearing condition for this
16It can be shown that, in the presence of adverse selection, the pledgeability constraint is binding in equilibrium
whenever
λ<
2 · (I − w(kt))
2
I2 +( I − w(kt))2.




15case can be expressed as:







1 − b pAS,t(λ)
=
1 − b pAS,t
1 − b pAS,t(λ)
.
,( 2 3 )
where in the last step we have substituted b pAS,t from Equation (16). Equation (23) provides
an intuition of how the likelihood that a loan applicant is denied credit, (1 − εt), changes. The
probability of rationing is decreasing in the diﬀerence between b pAS,t and b pAS,t(λ),i . e .b e t w e e nt h e
productivities of the marginal investor in the pure adverse-selection economy and in the economy
with both frictions.
Equation (23) completes our characterization of the equilibrium. When the pledgeability con-
straint binds, the interest rate on deposits must decrease to guarantee repayment: in the presence
of adverse selection, however, this provides incentives for less productive individuals to become
entrepreneurs, thereby increasing the demand for funds. Indeed, Equations (15) and (22) jointly
imply that decreases in λ lead to lower equilibrium levels of both rt+1 and b pAS,t(λ). In order to
restore market-clearing, borrowers must therefore be rationed. As Equation (23) shows, this ra-
tioning will increase with the severity of pledgeability constraints, i.e. with the diﬀerence between
b pAS,t and b pAS,t(λ).17
This discussion highlights an interesting implication of our model. In our setup, neither limited
pledgeability nor adverse selection per se have an eﬀect on the law of motion of the economy. When
considered separately, we have seen that each of them aﬀects the equilibrium interest rate but not
the productivity of projects that are ﬁnanced in equilibrium: one way to think about this is that
they do not aﬀect the order in which projects are ﬁnanced. When both frictions are combined,
however, this is no longer true: since b pAS,t(λ) ≤ b pAS,t, the average productivity of investment
17In this equilibrium, we can think of banks as oﬀering a lottery, i.e. a contract

e Lt+1 = I − w(kt), e Rt+1

coupled
with a probability of actually getting the loan equal to εt. T os e et h a tr a t i o n i n gi sc o m p a t i b l ew i t he q u i l i b r i u m ,
note that no bank can gain by oﬀering a contract that entails a lower probability of rationing in exchange for a
higher contractual interest rate: as long as the pledgeability constraint is binding, Rt+1 cannot be increased and
hence no proﬁtable deviations are feasible. Another deviation that might seem attractive for banks is to oﬀer a
similar contract with an application fee that, in the event of being rationed, entrepreneurs actually lose. Since less
productive individuals have less to gain from entrepreneurship, this might seem to discourage them from applying
to the contracts. Simple computation reveals that any such deviation will be equally attractive to all entrepreneurs
a n di tc a n n o tt h e r e f o r eb ep r o ﬁtable. In fact, if we can not lure low quality entrepreneurs away with a contract that
requires them to invest all their wage in the project, losing it if this turns to be a failure, then it is even less likely to
lure them away by charging an application fee that everybody lose with the same probability.
16actually falls in equilibrium. The reason is that, if lenders are to break even, limited pledgeability
requires the interest rate to be low; a low interest rate, in turn, decreases the returns to savings
and induces unproductive individuals to become entrepreneurs, thus exacerbating adverse selection.
This tension results in a low rate of interest and a large and relatively unproductive pool of potential
borrowers, which is why rationing is required to attain market clearing. This is the sense in which
both frictions exacerbate and “complement” one another so that, while each one of them does
not aﬀect the order in which projects are ﬁnanced, their interaction does: the average quality of
projects that are ﬁnanced falls relative to the frictionless economy, thereby slowing down capital
accumulation and growth. Formally, the law of motion is now given by:
kt+1 = A(b pAS,t(λ)) · (1 − γ) · k
γ
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2 · (I − w(kt))2






· (1 − γ) · k
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t if λ<
2 · (I − w(kt))2
I2 +( I − w(kt))2
,( 2 4 )
which lies below the law of motion of Equation (12) as long as the pledgeability constraint is
binding. As λ increases and the pledgeability constraint is relaxed, banks are able to raise the
contractual interest rate and this discourages ineﬃcient entry: consequently, there is an increase in
the average productivity of projects undertaken and the law of motion of this economy approaches
that of previous sections.
4 The open economy: capital ﬂows and ﬁnancial frictions
We now consider that our economy opens its ﬁnancial markets to the rest of the world, so that
individuals j ∈ Jt can borrow from and/or lend to the international ﬁnancial market. Throughout,
we assume that this market is willing and able to borrow or lend any amount at an expected gross
return of r∗. Hence, the underlying assumption is that our economy is small in relation to this
market and the analysis is thus restricted to the case of a small open economy.
In the closed economy, aggregate investment is constrained by the availability of domestic
resources and — ultimately — by the domestic capital stock. In the open economy, this is no longer
the case because investment can be ﬁnanced with foreign resources: in principle, the determinant
of investment is the international interest rate r∗.T or e ﬂect this, we use b p∗ (in all its variations)
17throughout to denote the probability of success of the marginal project undertaken, where the apex
(∗) signals that the variable refers to the open economy. Once the value of b p∗ is determined in
equilibrium, it follows that total investment in the economy equals (1 − b p∗) · I. Keeping this in
mind, we now characterize the equilibrium of our economy under international ﬁnancial integration
and for diﬀerent assumptions regarding the functioning of its credit market.
4.1 The frictionless economy
In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, the equilibrium of the open economy is straightforward. Given








,( 2 5 )
where q(·) denotes the rental price of capital and we have dropped time-subscripts to reﬂect the
fact that there are no state variables in this economy. Equation (25) illustrates that, in the absence
of ﬁnancial frictions, capital ﬂows between the small open economy and the rest of the world until
the return to domestic investment equals the international interest rate. From the perspective of
each generation t, then, total consumption is maximized when capital ﬂows between them and the
international ﬁnancial market at time t are unrestricted in any way.18
Given r∗, there is a unique value of b p∗ that satisﬁes Equation (25). Once this value is determined,
so is the steady-state level of capital k∗, which is formally given by:
k∗ = A(b p∗(r∗)) · (1 − b p∗(r∗)) · I = α · E [pj|p ≥ b p∗(r∗)] · (1 − b p∗(r∗)) · I
⇔
k∗ = α · I ·
∙













In the open economy, the credit-market equilibrium can thus be found simply by determining
the value of b p∗(r∗) that satisﬁes individual rationality and the zero-proﬁt condition of banks. The
fact that b p∗(r∗) depends only on the international interest rate and that it is independent of the
economy’s capital stock kt reﬂects a well-known feature of small open economies in the absence
of ﬁnancial frictions: they converge immediately to the steady state and there are no dynamics
18From an intergenerational perspective, however, the issue is more complicated. The reason is the usual one in
this class of models: greater capital accumulation today, even if costly for the current generation, beneﬁts future
generations through higher wages. Although certainly interesting, a full analysis of welfare implications would exceed
the scope of this paper and we therefore leave it for future research.
18to speak of. This result is standard and we shall not dwell on it. We turn instead to the more
interesting implications of ﬁnancial frictions for capital ﬂows.
4.2 Adverse selection
In our analysis of adverse selection of Section 3.2, we found that it fell upon the interest rate to
ensure market-clearing in the closed economy. We concluded then that, in the presence of adverse
selection, the equilibrium interest rate had to increase up to the point at which the marginal investor
was the same as in the frictionless economy, i.e. b pAS,t = b pt for all t. But how does adverse selection
aﬀect the direction and magnitude of capital ﬂows when our economy becomes integrated with the
international ﬁnancial market?
As before, we begin by focusing our attention on the probability of success of the marginal
investor b p∗










· (I − w(kt))
,( 2 7 )
must hold in equilibrium in order to satisfy the participation constraint of entrepreneurs while
allowing banks to break even. Equation (27) implicitly deﬁnes b p∗
AS,t(r∗,k t), the probability of
success that the marginal investment project must have in equilibrium given the international
interest rate r∗. Our choice of notation already points to an important modiﬁcation relative to the
analysis of the previous section: once adverse selection is introduced, b p∗
AS,t is no longer independent
of kt and dynamics are therefore inﬂuenced by the state of the economy. The reason, of course, is
that the capital stock aﬀects wages and thus the incentive of individuals to become entrepreneurs.
Although Equation (27) does not deliver a closed-form expression for b p∗
AS,t,w ec a nd i ﬀerentiate
it to establish that — in equilibrium and for a given value of r∗ — b p∗
AS,t is increasing in w(kt) so that
total investment is decreasing in the economy’s capital stock.19 Taking this into account, the law
19When diﬀerentiating Equation (27) it must be kept in mind that the following holds in equilibrium:













Diﬀerentiation of Equation (27) also reveals that, given kt, e p
∗
AS,t is increasing in r
∗ so that domestic investment is
decreasing in the international interest rate.
19of motion of the economy is given by,
kt+1 = A(b p∗
AS,t(r∗,k t)) ·
³
1 − b p∗
AS,t(r∗,k t)
´
· I = α · I · E
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The thick line in Figure 1 illustrates a representative law of motion for the capital stock in
the small open economy under adverse selection, where k∗ denotes the steady-state level of capital
in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions. Two important features stand out: (i) the law of motion
lies everywhere above the corresponding law of motion for the frictionless economy, and; (ii) it is
downward-sloping.20 We now discuss each of these features separately.
By fostering the cross-subsidization of less productive individuals, adverse selection exacerbates
investment. In the closed economy, we have seen how this excess investment can be counterbalanced
by an increase in the equilibrium interest rate. In the open economy, in which the interest rate
is given and equals r∗, there is no such countervailing force. Consequently, the adverse-selection
20On the horizontal axis, the ﬁgure depicts values of kt for which w(kt) <I, so that the adverse selection problem is
binding throughout. Once this ceases to be the case, the law of motion naturally coincides with that of the frictionless
economy.
20economy overinvests relative to the frictionless economy, which explains why the law of motion lies
everywhere above k∗. T h i si so fc o u r s et r u ei ns t e a d ys t a t ea sw e l l ,s ot h a ti fw el e tk∗
AS denote
the steady-state level of capital in this economy, it must necessarily hold that k∗
AS >k ∗ as depicted
in the ﬁgure. In equilibrium, adverse selection thus leads the economy to undertake investment
projects with returns that are lower than the international interest rate so that — contrary to
common results in the literature — this type of friction introduces a negative wedge between the
marginal return to investment and the international interest rate. Thus, from the perspective of
generation t, total consumption would be clearly maximized by raising the domestic interest rate
at time t so as to eliminate this wedge, eﬀectively taxing domestic investment and subsidizing
domestic savings.21 This would amount, in practice, to taxing capital inﬂows (if the economy is a
net capital importer) or to subsidizing capital outﬂows (if the economy is a net capital exporter).
The second important feature of the law of motion depicted in Figure 1 is that it is downward
sloping. The reason for this is that, as we mentioned above, b p∗
AS,t is increasing in w(kt).W h e n
the capital stock and wages are low, less productive individuals have a strong incentive to become
entrepreneurs: since they need to borrow most of the investment from banks, they will be heavily
cross-subsidized by the more productive individuals. As the capital stock and wages increase,
however, the extent of cross-subsidization decreases and entrepreneurship loses its appeal for less
productive individuals. This raises b p∗
AS,t, depressing investment and capital accumulation.
This last discussion points to an interesting implication of adverse selection in the context of a
small open economy: it generically exacerbates economic volatility. Whereas in ﬁnancial autarky
the economy converges monotonically to its steady state, the open economy necessarily displays
oscillatory behavior.22 The reason, of course, is the same as before. When wages are low, so
is b p∗
AS,t and total investment is therefore high: in this case, even individuals with relatively low
productivities are attracted by the extent of cross-subsidization oﬀered by large loan sizes I−w(kt).
This surge in investment increases the future capital stock and wages, though, which eventually
21For a given capital stock kt, the total consumption of generation t can be expressed as follows:




(1 − e p
∗
AS,t(r
∗,k t)) · I − (1 − γ) · (kt)
γ
,
where: kt+1 is a function of e p
∗
AS,t(r
∗,k t) as in Equation (28); the ﬁrst term represents the total capital income of
the economy in period t +1 , and; the second term represents the net interest payments made to the international




∗ in equilibrium, maximization of ct+1 requires eﬀectively raising
the domestic interest rate above r
∗ so as to reduce domestic capital accumulation and decrease net interest payments
to the international ﬁnancial market.
22The steady state of this economy can in principle be either stable or unstable. Although the economy displays
ﬂuctuations in both cases, in the case of stability it ﬂuctuates while converging to the steady state.
21discourages investment by unproductive individuals and brings about a reduction in output that
restarts the economic cycle.
We have thus designed a model in which adverse selection has no real eﬀects under ﬁnancial
autarky. When individuals are allowed to borrow from and/or lend to the international ﬁnancial
market, however, the picture is drastically diﬀerent. Adverse selection exacerbates investment and
capital accumulation and, even in the absence of any type of uncertainty, generates volatility.23 As
we now show, this is very diﬀerent from the standard role attributed to ﬁnancial frictions in the
open economy, which we analyze next.
4.3 Limited pledgeability
Just as we did for the case of the closed economy, we are want to assess how the introduction of
limited pledgeability aﬀects our results regarding adverse selection. To do so, we ﬁrst isolate the
implications of limited pledgeability in the small open economy.
Relative to the frictionless case of Section 4.1, consider that the economy is subject to a pledge-
ability constraint as in Equation (18). Using b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t) to denote the probability of success of the














,( 2 9 )
must be satisﬁed in equilibrium. Equation (29) provides, for each level of r∗, the probability of suc-
cess of the marginal investor that is consistent with both the participation constraint of individuals
and the zero-proﬁt condition of banks given the pledgeability constraint. A ﬁrst observation that
emerges from it is that, as in the case of adverse selection, the introduction of limited pledgeability
implies that b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t) is no longer independent of kt and dynamics are therefore inﬂuenced by the
state of the economy. The reason is that, through its eﬀect on wages, the capital stock aﬀects the
extent to which investors are leveraged and thus the extent to which the pledgeability constraint
binds in equilibrium.
Equation (29) deﬁnes a (weakly) decreasing relationship between b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t) and kt,s ot h a t
total investment is increasing in the economy’s capital stock. Taking this into account, the law of
motion of the economy is given by,
23It is important to stress that the existence of these cycles in the presence of adverse selection does not rely on
investment projects having a ﬁxed size. In a closely related setting, Martin (2008) shows how similar cycles may arise
in an environment in which the size of projects is variable.
22kt+1 = A(b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t)) · (1 − b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t)) · I = α · E [pj|p ≥ b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t)] · (1 − b p∗
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if w(kt) ≥ (1 − λ) · I
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(30)








The thick line in Figure 2 illustrates a representative law of motion for the capital stock in the
small open economy under limited pledgeability. The ﬁgure, in which k denotes the capital stock at
which the pledgeability constraint ceases to bind, depicts the case of an economy that has one steady
state k∗
t(λ) in which investment is constrained. Two important features stand out: (i) as long as
the pledgeability constraint is binding, the law of motion lies everywhere below the corresponding
law of motion for the frictionless economy, and; (ii) the law of motion is upward-sloping.24
24Figure 2 illustrates the law of motion as being strictly concave, which need not be the case. Intuitively, there
are two opposing forces that determine the shape of the law of motion: (i) the diminishing marginal productivity of
investment and capital, which makes the law of motion concave, and; (ii) the relaxation of the pledgeability constraint
as capital and wages increase, which makes the law of motion convex. The exact shape of the law of motion depends
on the relative strength of these two forces, which may give rise to multiple steady states in this small-open economy.
For a thorough discussion of this point in a related model, see Matsuyama (2004).
23When w(kt) > (1−λ)·I, the pledgeability constraint is not binding and Equation (30) coincides
with the law of motion of the frictionless economy. When w(kt) < (1 −λ) · I and the pledgeability
constraint binds, the economy underinvests relative to the frictionless economy and the law of
motion lies below k∗: Figure 2 illustrates the case in which the economy has a unique steady state
that lies in this range, denoted by k∗(λ). Limited pledgeability thus prevents the economy from
undertaking all those investment projects with returns that exceed the international interest rate,
so that in equilibrium it introduces a positive wedge between the marginal return to investment and
the international interest rate. From the perspective of generation t, therefore, total consumption
would be maximized by lowering the domestic interest rate at time t so as to eliminate this wedge,
eﬀectively subsidizing domestic investment and taxing domestic savings.25 This would amount,
in practice, to taxing capital outﬂows (if the economy is a net capital exporter) or to subsidizing
capital inﬂows (if the economy is a net capital importer).
The second important feature of the law of motion depicted in Figure 2 is that it is upward
sloping so that, whenever the pledgeability constraint is binding, the economy does not converge
immediately to the steady state. The reason for this is clear. Under a binding pledgeability
constraint, the productivity of the marginal investor depends on his wages and b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t) is
therefore a function of kt. For any given value of r∗, increases in the capital stock relax borrowing
constraints and lead to a decrease in b p∗
t(·) and an expansion in investment.
Our simple model thus reproduces a common result in the international ﬁnance literature.
As captured by a binding pledgeability constraint, a low quality of ﬁnancial institutions tends to
r e s t r i c ti n v e s t m e n t . I nS e c t i o n3 . 3 ,w ea r g u e dt h a t this depresses the equilibrium interest rate
under ﬁnancial autarky. This implies that, under ﬁnancial integration, economies with low levels
of λ will tend to experience greater capital outﬂows (or lower inﬂows) than they otherwise would.
This summarizes, in a nutshell, the mechanism emphasized by much of the literature to account
for the seeming inability of developing economies to attract capital ﬂows despite the high returns
to capital accumulation in many of them.26,27 A similar mechanism underlies the “asymmetric
ﬁnancial development” view of global imbalances, according to which the large recent capital ﬂows
out of many Asian economies (predominantly China) are due to the inability of these economies of
25The analysis in this case is the mirror image of the one carried out for the adverse-selection economy (see Footnote
21).
26See, for example, Boyd and Smith (1997) and Matsuyama (2004), among others.
27Of course, private contracting frictions between borrowers and lenders are not the only reason for which these
countries might fail to attract capital. It is commonly believed that opportunistic behavior by the government plays
a substantial role as well. For a recent view along these lines, see Broner and Ventura (2010).
24supplying ﬁn a n c i a la s s e t s ,i . e .o ft r a n s l a t i n gah i g hp r o ductivity of physical investment into a high
return for lenders.28
As in the closed economy, the implications of limited pledgeability and adverse selection for
total investment and for the direction and magnitude of capital ﬂows therefore mirror one another.
Real-world credit markets are not characterized solely by adverse selection or by limited pledge-
ability, however, but rather by a mixture of the two. It is important then to know whether our
ﬁndings of Section 4.2 regarding the eﬀects of adverse selection are robust to the inclusion of limited
pledgeability.
4.4 A tale of two frictions: capital ﬂows in the open economy
Consider the case of a small open economy in which both frictions, limited pledgeability and adverse
selection, coexist and interact with one another. In this case, any equilibrium in the open economy
must jointly satisfy the participation constraint of Equation (13), the zero-proﬁt condition of banks
of Equation (14) and the pledgeability constraint of Equation (22). Whenever the latter is binding,
these three equations determine the relationship that r∗, on the one hand, and b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗),o n




2 · (I − w(kt)) − λ(2I − w(kt))
.( 3 1 )
r∗ = qt+1 · α ·
I · λ · (1 − λ)
2 · (I − w(kt)) − λ(2I − w(kt))
,( 3 2 )
Equation (31) illustrates, once again, that there is a unique value of b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗) that is able to
simultaneously satisfy the participation constraint of individuals and the economy’s pledgeability
constraint while allowing banks to break even. It shows that, when both frictions are present,
b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗) is increasing in w(kt) and thus in the capital stock: exactly as the adverse-selection
economy of Section 4.2, then, increases in the capital stock discourage relatively unproductive
individuals from becoming entrepreneurs and thereby improve the quality of potential borrowers.
Equation (32), however, illustrates that this cannot be the whole story. Increases in w(kt) and thus
in the capital stock raise the right-hand side of the equation: but if b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗) increases at the
same time, investment falls and qt+1 must rise as well. This is clearly incompatible with a ﬁxed
interest rate r∗.
28Caballero et al. (2008) provide a theoretical framework along these lines.
25How can Equations (31) and (32) be jointly satisﬁed, then? Exactly as in the case of the closed
economy, the probability of rationing (1−εt) does the trick, since — by decoupling the productivity
of the marginal investor from total investment — it enables b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗) and qt+1 to move in
opposite directions.29 Given b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗), which determines the quality of potential borrowers,
the probability of rationing determines actual investment, the future capital stock kt+1 and thus
the rental price of capital qt+1. Taking this into account, the law of motion of the economy can be
formally expressed by,
kt+1 = A(b p∗
AS,t(λ,kt,r∗)) · (1 − b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t)) · εt(λ,r∗,k t) · I
= α · E [pj|p ≥ b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t)] · (1 − b p∗
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AS,t(r∗,k t) is as in as in Section (4.2), i.e. the productivity of the marginal investor once
the pledgeability constraint ceases to bind, and χ(λ,r∗,k t) ≤ 1.30 An example of Equation (33) is
depicted graphically in Figure 3 below.
29Relative to the closed economy of Section 3.4, this small-open economy has one less equation (the market-clearing
condition) and one less endogenous variable (the interest rate). Hence, exactly as in the case of the closed economy,
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30When the pledgeability constraint ceases to bind, rationing disappears, εt =1 , and the interest rate depicted in
Equation (32) equals the interest rate of the pure adverse-selection economy in Equation (27). A comparison of these
two expressions yields that they are equal when w(kt)=χ(λ,r
∗,k t,) · (1 − λ) · I,w h e r e ,
χ(λ,r
∗,k t,)=
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Figure 3 - Adverse Selection and Limited Pledgeability
kAS
∗ k
The thick line in Figure 3 illustrates a representative law of motion for the capital stock in the
small open economy under both limited pledgeability and adverse selection. The economy depicted
in the ﬁgure has a unique steady state, denoted by k∗
AS, in which the pledgeability constraint is
no longer binding. Two important features stand out: (i) as long as the pledgeability constraint
is binding, the law of motion lies everywhere below the corresponding law of motion for the pure
adverse-selection economy, and; (ii) the law of motion is non-monotonic.
When wt >χ·(1−λ)·I, the pledgeability constraint is not binding and Equation (33) coincides
with the law of motion of the pure adverse-selection economy of Section 4.2. When wt <χ ·(1−λ)·I
and the pledgeability constraint binds, the economy’s production of capital is instead hindered
relative to the pure-adverse selection economy. One might be tempted to think that, in this case,
the constraint imposed by limited pledgeability is actually helpful to mitigate the overinvestment
induced by adverse selection. This constraint, however, only makes the adverse selection problem
worse: by limiting the contractual interest rate that banks can charge entrepreneurs, it provides
even greater incentives for ineﬃcient individuals to become entrepreneurs. In this sense, and exactly
as we found for the case of the closed economy in Section 3.4, both frictions exacerbate one another
and this leads to a fall in the average productivity of investment. Ultimately, limited pledgeability
does indeed limit investment relative to the pure adverse-selection economy, but it does so randomly
through rationing and not selectively by weeding out relatively unproductive individuals.
From the perspective of generation t, the maximization of total consumption requires a combi-
nation of taxes and subsidies. On the one hand, the distortions originating in limited pledgeability
can only be dealt with through a decrease in the domestic interest rate that enable banks to break
27even: this requires, for example, a subsidy on capital inﬂo w s( i nt h ec a s eo fan e tc a p i t a li m p o r t e r )
or a tax on capital outﬂows (in the case of a net capital exporter). On the other hand, the distor-
tions originating in adverse selection can only be dealt with through an increase in the interest rate
obtained by domestic savers: this requires, for example, a subsidy to domestic depositors so as to
discourage relatively unproductive individuals from becoming entrepreneurs.
The second important feature of the law of motion depicted in Figure 3 is that it is non-
monotonic. When the economy’s capital stock is low and the pledgeability constraint is binding, the
law of motion is upward sloping. This happens even though increases in the capital stock raise wages
and make entrepreneurship less appealing for relatively unproductive individuals, thereby increasing
b p∗
t(λ,r∗,k t). But this reduction in the pool of borrowers decreases the need for equilibrium rationing
and, ultimately, it is this fall in rationing what makes kt+1 increasing in kt. Once the pledgeability
constraint ceases to bind and rationing disappears altogether, the law of motion coincides with that
of Section 4.2 and it becomes downward-sloping.
The introduction of limited pledgeability therefore enriches the dynamic eﬀects of adverse selec-
tion as characterized in Section 4.2. First, it slows down capital accumulation not by mitigating the
eﬀects of adverse selection for overinvestment, but rather by exacerbating them to bring about a
decrease in the average productivity of investment. Second, as we saw in the analysis of Section 4.3,
limited pledgeability can give rise to multiple steady states.31 Of these steady states, only one can
lie on the downward-sloping part of the law of motion in Figure 3. This implies that institutional
reforms that increase λ shift the economy’s law of motion upwards and they eventually eliminate
all steady states but k∗
AS. In this case, improvements in institutional quality relax borrowing con-
straints until, in the long run, the pledgeability constraint ceases to bind and the only remaining
friction is adverse selection. These increases in λ expand leverage and enhance the productivity of
investment but, due to the oscillatory nature of k∗
AS, they must also fuel economic volatility in the
long-run.
This discussion illustrates two important implications of our model. The ﬁrst is that the de-
velopment of ﬁnancial markets, as well as the set of policies aimed at improving their eﬃciency, is
not necessarily one-dimensional. When both frictions are present, for example, we have seen how
they complement one another: this means that, to improve the allocation of resources, policies
that improve creditor rights might be just as useful as policies that lower the cost of screening
borrowers. The relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent policies, however, might vary according to the level
31See Footnote 24.
28of economic development. A second and related implication is precisely that some of the problems
associated to adverse selection might surface only when the economy surpasses a certain level of
wealth or ﬁnancial development. During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, for example, economists were
taken aback by the diﬃculties faced by the seemingly developed ﬁnancial markets of the United
States. How could it be that these markets had done such a poor job of allocating credit? Our
model highlights that some of these problems, like excessive investment and the resulting volatility
associated with it, can only arise precisely where ﬁnancial markets surpass a minimum level of
economic development. In a world in which a substantial fraction of economies are characterized
by poor ﬁnancial institutions, it may well be that the economy where these institutions work best
will end up being most visibly aﬀected by the problems of adverse selection.32
5C o n c l u s i o n
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in ﬁnancial
markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of ﬁnancial frictions,
however, which have focused almost exclusively on the eﬀects of limited pledgeability. In this paper,
we have attempted to ﬁll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection.
Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection: (i) leads to an
increase in the economy’s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negative wedge between
the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. We have shown how, under
ﬁnancial integration, these eﬀects translate into excessive capital inﬂows and generate endogenous
ﬂuctuations in the capital stock and output. We have also explored how these results change
when limited pledgeability is added to the model, and we have concluded that there is a sense in
which both frictions complement one another: if anything, limited pledgeability exacerbates the
consequences of adverse selection on the macroeconomy.
Our analysis is incomplete in two important respects. The ﬁrst one is that we have stopped
short of characterizing the full welfare implications of adverse selection and limited pledgeability.
Instead, we have referred exclusively to the contemporaneous eﬀects of these frictions on each
generation of savers that is exposed to them. This shortcoming of our analysis is not due to lack
32Imagine, for example, that the world is made up of two economies like the one analyzed in this section, one of
which is characterized by a low level of λ.U n d e rﬁnancial integration, capital in this world will tend to ﬂow towards
the economy with the most developed markets, which will receive them as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, these
inﬂows will be beneﬁcial because they will lower the cost of ﬁnancing and allow for an expansion in the capital stock;
on the other hand, they may also be costly by fueling ineﬃcient investments and economic volatility.
29of interest on our behalf. As we mentioned in the main body of the text, a full welfare analysis
is quite involved because it requires the balancing of diﬀerent eﬀects across generations. There is
simply no space for this here.
A second and related shortcoming is that we have restricted our analysis of ﬁnancial integration
to the case of a small open economy. Doing so has been instrumental to simplify the analysis
and it has allowed us to portray the eﬀects of adverse selection and limited pledgeability in a
very clear manner. It has also, however, prevented us from using the model to directly address
the recent turn of events. The prevailing view on global imbalances and ﬁn a n c i a lf r i c t i o n si st h a t
limited pledgeability has been at the heart of capital ﬂows between Asia and the United States.
According to this view, the United States has only stood to gain from these inﬂo w s .H o wi st h i sv i e w
aﬀected once the importance of adverse selection is acknowledged? Is it possible that, through their
eﬀects on the interest rate, these capital inﬂows exacerbate adverse selection and lead to ineﬃcient
investment in the United States? Can the United States ultimately suﬀer a welfare loss if the rest
of the world uses its ﬁnancial system to intermediate resources? Addressing these questions should
be the exciting next step in this research agenda.
30References
[1] Aghion, Philippe and Philippe Bachetta and Abhijit Banerjee. Financial Development and the
Instability of Open Economies, Journal of Monetary Economics, 51 (6), 2004.
[2] Aoki, Kosuke and Gianluca Benigno and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki. Adjusting to Capital Account
Liberalization, Working paper, 2009.
[3] Bernanke, Ben. The Future of Mortgage Finance in the United States, The B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy, 9 (3), Article 2, 2009.
[4] Besanko, David and Anjan Thakor. Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under
Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 167-182, 1987.
[5] Boyd, John, and Bruce Smith, Capital Market Imperfections, International Credit Markets,
and Nonconvergence, Journal of Economic Theory 73, 335-64, 1997.
[6] Broner, Fernando and Jaume Ventura. Globalization and Risk Sharing, Forthcoming, Review
of Economic Studies, 2010.
[7] Brunnermeier, Markus. Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 23 (1), 77-100, 2009.
[8] Caballero, Ricardo J., Emmanuel Farhi and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. An Equilibrium Model
of “Global Imbalances” and Low Interest Rates, American Economic Review, 98 (1), 358—393,
2008.
[9] Caballero, Ricardo J. and Arvind Krishnamurthy. International and Domestic Collateral Con-
straints in a Model of Emerging Market Crises, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 48,
513—548, 2001.
[10] De Meza, David and David Webb. Too Much Investment: a Problem of Asymmetric Informa-
tion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (2), 281-292, 1987.
[11] Gertler, Mark, and Kenneth Rogoﬀ, North-South Lending and Endogenous Domestic Capital
Market Ineﬃciencies, Journal of Monetary Economics 26, 245-66, 1998.
[12] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Law and
ﬁnance. Journal of Political Economy 101, 678-709, 1998.
31[13] Lorenzoni, Guido. Ineﬃcient Credit Booms, Review of Economic Studies, 75 (3), 809-833,
2008.
[14] Martin, Alberto. Endogenous Credit Cycles, Mimeo, 2008.
[15] Matsuyama, Kiminori. Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking and Endogenous
Inequality of Nations, Econometrica, 72 (3), 853-884, 2004.
[16] Mendoza, Enrique, Vincenzo Quadrini and Jose Victor Rios-Rull. On The Welfare Implications
of Financial Globalization without Financial Development, NBER Working Paper 13412, 2007.
[17] Reichlin, Pietro and Paolo Siconolﬁ. Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard along the
Business Cycle, Economic Theory, 24, 75-109, 2004.
[18] Rothschild M., Stiglitz J., Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-649, 1976.
[19] Solow, Robert. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 70, 65-94, 1956
32